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WASHINGTON AND LEE LA WREVIEW
statutory damages under the Copyright Act. Because a copyright in-
fringement action enforces a right analogous to a right traditionally en-
forced at common law, and the statutory damage remedy is legal in
nature, an action for statutory damages under the Act carries the
seventh amendment's guarantee. In actions for statutory damages under
other statutes, the Fourth Circuit will find a constitutional right to a
jury trial if the statutory damage remedy sought is legal in nature, and
the statutorily protected right is analogous to a right traditionally en-
forced at common law.
DAVID PHIPPEN
XII. TAX
A. Mitigation of Limitations
The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) of 1954 contains various statutes
of limitations that bar untimely actions for recovery of tax refunds by a
taxpayer or the collection of deficiencies by the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice.1 Under certain conditions, however, sections 1311-1314 of the IRC
allow the Commission of Internal Revenue to assess or collect taxes or a
taxpayer to seek refund of taxes in a tax year otherwise closed by the
statute of limitations.2 The mitigation provisions of sections 1311-1314
prevent inequitable taxation or tax avoidance which would result from
the successful challenge of the proper tax year for the inclusion or exclu-
1 I.R.C. §§ 6501, 6511. Under the Internal Revenue Code, a three-year statute of
limitations applies to the assessment and collection of taxes. I.R.C. § 6501. The limitations
period starts at the time of the filing of a tax return or the filing deadline, whichever is
later. Id. False tax returns, willful tax evasion, and failure to file a return are exempt from
the statute of limitations bar to the assessment and collection of taxes. Id. § 6501(c); Treas.
Reg. §§ 301.6501(c)-1(a) to .6501(c)-1(c) (1956); see Leo Gurdin, 33 T.C.M. 1116, 1121 (1974)
(statute of limitations inapplicable to tax fraud), affd, 536 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1976). Taxpayer
errors in excess of 25/o of gross income are subject to a six-year limitations period. I.R.C. §
6501(e)(1); see Peters v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 226, 230 (1968) (Commissioner allowed six
years to issue deficiency notice for tax errors in excess of 25/o of gross income). The tax-
payer must file a claim for refund or credit within three years from the time of filing or
within two years from the time the tax was paid, whichever expires later. I.R.C. § 6511. See
generally 4 B. BrTTKER FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTs 1 113.1-.9 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as BITTKER]; TAX MNGM-T (BNA) § 28-3rd (1978).
SI.R.C. §§ 1311-1314. Sections 1311-1314 of the Internal Revenue Code prevent a tax-
payer or the government from invoking the statute of limitations to benefit from errors
made in a closed year. Id.; see note 6 infra. Section 1311(a) authorizes adjustment in 'cir-
cumstances that otherwise would prevent the correction of an error. I.R.C. § 1311(a). Sec-
tions 1311-1314 can apply to bars other than the statute of limitations such as res judicata




sion of gross income if the correct tax year is closed by the statute of
limitations.' If the requirements of section 1311 are satisfied,4 section
1312(3)(A) 5 allows the Commissioner to make a correcting adjustment in
a closed tax year' to include income excluded bv a determination.' In
S. REP. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 48 (1938). The Senate Finance Committee in
the report accompanying the Revenue Bill of 1938 stated that disputes over the correct year
to include income or deductions should not result in double taxation, double reduction of
tax, or double avoidance of tax. Id. at 49-50. The Committee, in promulgating the mitigation
provisions, sought to keep the essential function of the statute of limitations intact by
establishing strict requirements for the applicationof the provisions. Id. at 49; see text ac-
companying notes 57-61 infra.
' See text accompanying notes 22-26 infra; note 32 infra.
3 I.R.C. § 1312(3)(A); see BITTKER, supra note 1, at 113.9; TAX MNGM'T (BNA) §
110-2nd (1978). Section 1312(3)(A) outlines the requirements of the double exclusion of an
item of gross income from taxable income. I.R.C. § 1312(3)(A). Double exclusion occurs when
a determination correctly excludes an item of gross income that was included in the wrong
year. Id. Section 1311(a) then allows the inclusion of the item of gross income in the proper
year. Id. § 1311(a); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1311(a)-i to .1311(a-2 (1956). To provide an example of a
situation described by § 1312(3)(A), assume a taxpayer included $5,000 of gross income in his
1975 tax return that he should have included in his 1972 tax return. See I.R.C. § 1312(3)(A).
Then, the taxpayer realized his error, sued for, and was granted a refund for the taxes paid
on the $5,000. Assume further that the statute of limitation bars the I.R.S. from making a
corresponding correcting adjustment for the 1972 taxable year. Without the mitigation pro-'
visions of §§ 1311-1314, the government could not collect the tax due in the 1972 tax year.
See id. §§ 1311-1314. Section 1312(3)(A) authorizes an adjustment in this circumstance, and §
1311(a) mitigates the'normal statute of limitations if all the requirements of the mitigation
provisions are satisfied to allow assessment and collection of the tax for the otherwise clos-
ed year. See id. §§ 1312(3)(A), 1311(a); text accompanying notes 22-26 infra. Section 1312
authorizes adjustment in closed years in other situations. See I.R.C. § 1312. Section 1312(1)
describes the double inclusion in taxable income of an item of gross income. Id. § 1312(1); see
Treas. Reg. § 1.1312-1 (1956). Section 1312(2) describes the double allowance of a deduction or
credit. I.R.C. § 1312(2); see Treas. Reg. § 1.1312-2 (1956). Section 1312(5) specifies correlative
deductions and inclusions for trusts or estates and legatees, beneficiaries, or heirs. I.R.C. §
1312(5); see Treas. Reg. § 1.1312-5 (1956). Section 1312(6) lists correlative deductions and
credits for certain related corporationsI.R.C. § 1312(6); see Treas. Reg. § 1.1312-6 (1956).
In two situations which § 1312 describes, however, no adjustment is authorized if the
statute of limitations closes the correct year. See I.R.C. § 1312. Section 1312(3)(B) describes
items upon which taxes were not paid and which were not included in a tax return. Id. §
1312(3)(B). This occurs when a determination requires that an item not included in gross
income and on which no tax was paid be excluded from gross income in that year. Id.; see
Treas. Reg. § 1312-3(b) (1956). An adjustment correction cannot be made if the statute of
limitations bars the correction. I.R.C. § 1311(b)(2); see Treas. Reg. § 1.1311(a)-l(c). Section/
1312(4) describes the double disallowance of a deduction or credit. I.R.C. § 1312(4); see
Treas. Reg. § 1312-4 (1956). No adjustment correction can be made if the correction is barred
by the statute of limitations. I.R.C. § 1311(b)(2); see Treas. Reg. § 1.1311(a}-l(c) (1956). Addi-
tionally, certain categories of related taxpayers are subject to the mitigation provisions
when the item of income is reported by the wrong taxpayer. See BITTKER, supra note 1, at
113.9.2; Treas. Reg. § 1.1312 (1956); Id. § 1.1313(c)-i, T.D. 6617, 1962-2 C.B. 199.
' See generally BITTKER, supra note 1, at 113.1-.9. A closed year is a tax year in
which the running of the statute of limitations bars litigation or challenge of tax items. Id.
" I.R.C. § 1313(a)(1). A determination is a final decree, judgment or order by a court of
competent jurisdiction. Id. A Tax Court decision becomes final 90 days after the decision if
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Chertkof v. Commissioner8 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ex-
amined the requirements of sections 1312(3)(A) and 1311 to determine
whether the mitigation provisions of the IRC allowed the Commissioner
to assess taxes in a closed tax year.'
In Chertkof, taxpayer and his wife filed a joint income tax return for
tax year 1966.10 The return included income resulting from a stock
redemption distribution that the Chertkofs treated as a capital gain."
After an audit, the Commissioner ruled the redemption incomplete,"2
determined that the redemption should have been included in 1965, and
treated the income resulting from the redemption as ordinary income.
3
The Commissioner issued a deficiency notice for 1965 and refunded the
taxes the Chertkofs paid in 1966 on the redemption income. 4 The Chert-
kofs paid the deficiency for 1965 and sued for a refund.15 The United
the judgment is not appealed. Id. § 7481. A closing agreement pursuant to § 7121 of the IRC
is a determination and becomes final on the date the Commissioner approves the agree-
ment. Id. § 1313(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.1313(a-2 (1956). A final disposition of a claim for a re-
fund by the Secretary of the Treasury also constitutes a determination. I.R.C. § 1313(a)(3).
The time at which a determination becomes final depends on the type of action taken and
whether the taxpayer's claim was allowed. Treas. Reg. § 1.1313(a)-3(a). See TAX MNGM'T
(BNA) § 110-2nd, A6 (1978). Finally, an agreement pursuant to § 1313(a)(4) of the IRC is a
determination. I.R.C. § 1313(a)(4); Treas. Reg. § 1.1313(a)-4(a(2) (1956). See BITTKE.R, supra
note 1, at 113.9.4; TAX MNGM'T (BNA) § 110-2nd, A1-3 (1978).
649 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1981).
O Id.; see text accompanying notes 28-32 infra.
1' 649 F.2d at 265.
Id. Taxpayer and his father jointly owned all the stock in E & T Realty Company (E
& T). Id. To give Chertkof's father sole ownership of the business, Chertkof's father agreed
that E & T would redeem Chertkofs E & T stock. Id. Taxpayer obtained a "private letter
ruling" from the Internal Revenue Service stating that he would receive capital gains treat-
ment for the stock redemption distribution. Id.
"2 Id. at 265-66. To receive capital gains treatment, a stock redemption must be com-
plete and retire all taxpayer's stock. I.R.C. § 302(b)(3). Chertkof redeemed all his E & T
stock. 649 F.2d at 265. The family attribution rules in § 318 of the IRC, however, determine
stock ownership status for the purposes of the stock redemption requirements in § 302.
I.R.C. §§ 302,318. Therefore, unless Chertkof conformed to the additional requirements of §
302(c)(2), for tax purposes he would be considered to own the stock his father owns. I.R.C. §§
302, 318(a). Section 302(c)(2)(A)(ii) prohibited Chertkof from acquiring any interest in E & T,
including interest as an employee, director, or officer, for a period of ten years after the
redemption. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A)(ii). Pursuant to § 302(c)(2)(A}(iii) Chertkof filed an agreement
with the Secretary that he would not acquire any interest in violation of § 302(c(2)(A)(ii). Id.
§§ 302(c)(2)(A)(ii)-302(c)(2)(A)(iii). Chertkof, however, operating through a corporation in
which he and his wife owned 80% and 20% of the stock, respectively, executed and carried
out a management agreement with E & T. 649 F.2d at 265. The Fourth Circuit in Chertkof,
therefore, held that the execution of the management agreement through Chertkof's com-
pany violated the provisions of § 302(c)(2}(A)(ii). I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A}(ii); 649 F.2d at 270. Thus
the Chertkof court taxed the stock redemption as ordinary dividend income rather than as a
capital gain. Id.
1 649 F.2d at 266; see note 16 infra.
' 649 F.2d at 265-66.
Id. The Chertkofs' deficiency payment was in response to a statutory notice of defi-
ciency which the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued. Id.; see I.R.C. § 6212. A tax-
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States District Court for the District of Maryland held that 1966 was the
correct taxable year.16 Therefore, the Comissioner refunded the Chert-
kofs' 1965 deficiency payment17 and issued a notice of deficiency for
1966.18 The Chertkofs petitioned the Tax Court for a redetermination of
the 1966 deficiency and moved for summary judgment, arguing that 1966
was a closed tax year and that sections 1311-1314 did not apply to
mitigate the statute of limitations.19 The Tax Court agreed with the Com-
missioner that the mitigation provisions applied and denied the Chert-
kofs' motion .20 The Chertkofs appealed the decision of the Tax Court to
the Fourth Circuit.
21
payer has 90 days to petition the Tax Court for a redetermination of a deficiency. I.R.C. §
6213(a). During the 90 day period, and during the period of litigation if the petition is filed in
the Tax Court, the statute of limitations is tolled. See Phoenix Elec. Inc. v. United States,
164 F. Supp. 614, 615 (D. Mass. 1958). The deficiency is assessed if a taxpayer does not file a
petition in the Tax Court within 90 days. I.R.C. § 6213(c). Once assessed, a taxpayer must
pay the deficiency and may sue for refund in the United States Court of Claims or United
States District Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976 & 1979 Supp. III) (Court of Claims jurisdic-
tional grant); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1976 & 1979 Supp. III) (District Court jurisdictional
grant).
6 Perma-Rock Products, Inc. v. United States, 373 F. Supp. 159, 161 n.1 (D. Md. 1973).
The Perma-Rock court held that Chertkof did not receive consideration for the stock
redemption until 1966. Id. Since Chertkof was a cash basis taxpayer, the income was prop-
erly includable as taxable income when received. Id.
" 649 F.2d at 266. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue in Chertkof took a voluntary
dismissal from the appeal of the Maryland District Court's judgment that 1966 was the cor-
rect tax year for the stock redemption. Id. Thus, the district court's decision became final
and operated as a determination of the proper tax year. Id. at 267; see I.R.C. § 1313(a)(1);
note 6 supra.
.1 Chertkof v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 496, 498 (1976), affd, 649 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1981).
The statute of limitations for the collection of tax for the tax year 1966 ran on April 15,
1970. Id.; I.R.C. § 6501; see note 1 supra. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, however,
relied on the application of the mitigation provisions to eliminate the statutory bar to the
collection of the Chertkofs' taxes on their redemption income. 66 T.C. at 498-99.
19 Id.; see text accompanying notes 43-48 infra. Instead of petitioning the Tax Court for
a redetermination pursuant to § 6213 of the IRC, the Chertkofs could have paid the tax and
sued in the Court of Claims or the District Court for a refund. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976 & 1979
Supp. III) (Court of Claims jurisdictional grant); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1976 & 1979 Supp. III)
(District Court jurisdictional grant); see I.R.C. § 6213; note 15 supra.
' 66 T.C. at 509. The Tax Court in Chertkof held that the four prerequisites of the
mitigation provisions were satisfied. Id.; see text accompanying notes 22-26 infra. The Tax
Court held that the Maryland District Court's ruling in Perma-Rock Products, Inc. v. United
States, 373 F. Supp. 159 (D. Md. 1973), which required the exclusion of the item of gross in-
come from the 1965 tax year, operated as a determination causing an error in a closed year.
Chertkof v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. at 499; see note 7 supra. The Tax Court held that the in-
consistent position requirement of § 1311(b) was satisfied. 66 T.C. at 508; see Birchenough v.
United States, 410 F.2d 1247, 1251 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (taxpayer error not required); Yagoda v.
Commissioner, 39 T.C. 170, 179-80 (1962) (taxpayer error not required and inconsistent posi-
tion satisfied), affd, 331 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 379 U.S. 842 (1964); Albert W. Priest
Trust v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 221, 226-27 (1946) (taxpayer error not required and inconsis-
tent position satisfied); note 32 infra.
2'1 649 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1981).
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The Fourth Circuit in Chertkof recognized that the statute of limita-
tions would bar the Commissioner's deficiency assessment if sections
1311-1314 of the IRC did not apply and agreed with the Tax Court that
the mitigation provisions apply only if four prerequisites to adjustment
exist.' Application of the mitigation provisions requires a determina-
tion2 with respect to an open tax year that gives rise to an error in a
closed tax year. 4 The error must be one that falls into one of the circum-
stances of adjustment specified in section 1312, for example, potential
double exclusion, 25 and the party who prevailed in the determination
must have maintained a position inconsistent with the erroneous treat-
ment. 6 Since no doubt existed that there had been a determination, and
that the determination had given rise to an error in a closed tax year,2
the Fourth Circuit first examined the circumstances of adjustment re-
quirement to determine whether section 1312(3)(A) requires the tax-
payer rather than the Commissioner to have erred in the original treat-
ment of income.' The court in Chertkof held that section 1312(3)(A) of
the IRC does not require taxpayer error for the Commissioner to apply
the mitigation provisions to eliminate the statutory bar in the assess-
ment or collection of tax in a closed year.29 The Fourth Circuit next
determined that the Chertkofs satisfied the inconsistent position re-
quirement of section 1311(b).30 The Fourth Circuit noted that the tax-
payer's initial treatment of income is irrelevant to the inconsistent posi-
tion requirement s' and interpreted section 1311(b) as requiring only that
the position adopted in a determination be inconsistent with the erro-
neous treatment of income.
3
1
In holding that the Chertkofs satisfied the inconsistency require-
ments of the mitigation provisions outlined in section 1311(b), the Fourth
Circuit indicated that the Chertkofs' maintenance of the 1965 refund suit
constituted a position inconsistent with their payment of taxes on the
1965 distribution income, even though their payment was in response to
2 Id. at 266-67.
2 Id. at 267; see I.R.C. § 1313(a)(1); note 7 supra.
24 649 F.2d at 267; see I.R.C. § 1311; note 6 supra.
649 F.2d at 267; see I.R.C. § 1312; note 5 supra.
649 F.2d at 267; see I.R.C. § 1311(b); note 32 infra.
649 F.2d at 267; see note 20 supra.
649 F.2d at 267-69.
I& Section 1312(3)(A) contains no language specifying taxpayer error as a require-
ment of § 1312(3)(A). I.R.C. § 1312(3)(A); see note 5 supra. Moreover, courts have explicitly
rejected taxpayer error as a requirement of § 1312(3)(A). Yagoda v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.
at 179-80; Albert W. Priest Trust v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. at 226-27; see note 20 supra.
649 F.2d at 267-69.
Id. at 267-68.
Id. Section 1311(b)(1) requires that the taxpayer maintain a position inconsistent
with the erroneous treatment of income. I.R.C. § 1311(b)(1). Furthermore, the taxpayer's in-
consistent position must be adopted-in the determination. Id.; see note 7 supra. See gene-
rally TAX MNGM'T (BNA) § 110-2nd (1978).
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the Commissioner's erroneous deficiency notice for 1965.3 In Albert W.
Priest Trust v. Commissioner 4 and Yagoda v. Commissioner,35 the Tax
Court was confronted with the identical issue and held that the mitiga-
tion provisions applied where the taxpayers' inconsistent positions were
in response to erroneous deficiency notices from the Commissioner.6 In
neither case did the Tax Court state whether section 1311(b) required ac-
tive or passive inconsistency. 7 Passive inconsistency exists when the
taxpayer or Commissioner adopts the other party's treatment of income
and subsequently challenges the treatment as incorrect.' Active incon-
sistency, as asserted by the taxpayer in Yagoda, requires the taxpayer
to adopt purposely inconsistent treatmentsof income to hide behind the
statute of limitations. 9 In Yagoda, the Second Circuit affirmed the Tax
Court's holding that section 1311(b) does not require active inconsisten-
cy." Thus the Fourth Circuit in Chertkof held that section 1311(b) re-
quires passive inconsistency and that the Chertkofs satisfied the incon-
sistent position requirement even though their payment of taxes was in
response to an erroneous deficiency notice from the Commissioner.'
See 649 F.2d at 266-68.
3' 6 T.C. 211 (1946). In Albert W. Priest Trust v. Commissioner, the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue allowed the Priest estate a deduction for income distributable to
beneficiaries for the taxable year 1938. Id. at 223. The Commissioner in turn assessed a defi-
ciency for the beneficiary for 1938.Id. The Tax Court adopted the beneficiary's position that
the income was not currently taxable. Id. at 224. The Commissioner assessed a deficiency
against the estate for the amount of the deduction that the Commissioner erroneously
allowed. Id. The Commissioner relied on § 3801 ((nt. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 38, § 3801, 53
Stat. 471) (current version at I.R.C. §§,1311-1314)) to mitigate the statute of limitations. 6
T.C. at 226. The Tax Court held that the mitigation provisions applied regardless of
whether the Commissioner or the taxpayer made the initial error. Id.
1 39 T.C. 170 (1962), affld, 331 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 842 (1964). In
Yagoda v. Commissioner, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue refused to recognize the
existence of two trusts and issued a notice of deficiency for income previously attributed to
trust income against the individual establishing the trusts. Id. at 174. The District Court,
however, recognized the existence of the trusts and overturned the Commissioner's deci-
sion. Id. at 175. The Commissioner then refunded the erroneous taxes paid. Id. at 175-76.
Meanwhile, the statute of limitations bad run on the tax returns of the trusts. Id. The Com-
missioner issued a notice of deficiency against the trust for the amount of income which was
erroneously excluded from the trust's income. See id. (mitigation provisions of §§ 1311-1314
of the IRC authorize the adjustment of erroneous taxes for certain related taxpayers);
I.R.C. §§ 1313(c), 1311(b)(3), 1312; note 5 supra.
39 T.C. at 180-81; 6 T.C. at 226; see notes 34 & 35 supra.
39 T.C. at 180-81; 6 T.C. at 226.
See Yagoda v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d at 490-91 (detailing passive inconsistency);
Albert W. Priest Trust v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. at 226-27 (same); TAX MNGMT (BNA) §
110-2d, AS-10 (1978).
Yagoda v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d at 490-91.
'o Id.; see text accompanying notes 42-53 infra.
" 649 F.2d at 267-69. While the Fourth Circuit in Chertkof did not analyze the passive
inconsistency test, the court expressly rejected the Chertkofs' assertion that § 1311(b) re-
quired active inconsistency. Id. at 268; see I.R.C. § 1311(b).
19821
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The Chertkofs relied on the legislative history of the mitigation pro-
visions42 and the Third Circuit's decision in Kappel v. Commissioner43 to
argue that section 1311(b) requires that the party whose view prevailed
in the correcting adjustment for the open year maintain active incon-
sistency in relation to the erroneous treatment of income in the closed
year." The Chertkofs contended that a taxpayer must purposely assert
diametrically opposed tax treatments with the intention of benefiting
from the running of the statute of limitations to satisfy the active incon-
sistency test.45 Under the Chertkofs' reasoning, the Chertkofs' adoption
of the incorrect tax year in response to the Commissioner's erroneous
deficiency notice was not active inconsistency.4" No court, however, has
adopted the Chertkofs' active inconsistency reasoning. 5 Although the
Court of Claims has adopted an active inconsistency test, the test re-
quires only that the taxpayer sue for a refund claiming the tax year is in-
correct after having adopted the identical tax year." In Birchenough v.
42 Brief for Appellant at 8-9, Chertkof v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1981)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant]. The Chertkofs maintained that the Senate,
through the Senate Finance Committee Report on the Revenue Act of 1938, established ac-
tive inconsistency as a prerequisite to the operation of the mitigation provisions. Id. The
Chertkofs focused on the Committee's language stating that the party benefiting from the
statutory bar must maintain active inconsistency to justify the mitigation of the statute of
limitations. S. REP. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 48, 49 (1938); see text accompanying note
45 infra.
4' 615 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1980). In Kappel v. Commissioner the Kappels erroneously failed
to report a taxable item of income for the years 1954 and 1955. Id. at 93. The Commissioner
of Internal Revenue issued a notice of deficiency only for 1955 because the statute of limita-
tions barred adjustment for 1954. Id. The Kappels paid the deficiency and filed a refund
'claim for the taxes paid, alleging that the income was properly includable in 1954. Id. The
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania held that a portion of the in-
come was taxable in 1954. Kappel v. United States, 369 F. Supp. 267, 273 (W.D. Pa. 1974.
Accordingly, the Commissioner issued a deficiency notice for 1954. 615 F.2d at 93. The Kap-
pels petitioned the Tax Court for a redetermination. Id. The Tax Court held that the mitiga-
tion provisions applied because § 1312(3)(A) described the situation. Kappel v. Commis-
sioner, 70 T.C. 415, 421-22 (1978), rev'd, 615 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1980). Therefore, the Tax Court
held that the statute of limitations no longer barred the collection of Kappel's taxes for
1954. Id. at 428. The Third Circuit reversed, however, and held the mitigation provisions did
not apply because § 1312(3)(B) described the situation. 615 F.2d at 97. But see Treas. Reg. §
1.1312-3 (1956) (mitigation provisions apply since situation described by § 1312(3(A)). The
Third Circuit stated that the taxpayers must maintain active inconsistency for the mitiga-
tion provisions to apply. 615 F.2d at 96-97.
The Fourth Circuit in Chertkof distinguished Kappel because in Kappel the Commis-
sioner attempted to collect tax for a year on which the statute of limitations had run before
the first deficiency notice was issued. Chertkof v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d at 269 n.4. See
615 F.2d at 93. But see Treas. Reg. 1.1312-3(a)(2)(ii) (1956) (situation described by § 1312(3)(A)
warranting the application of the mitigation provisions).
" Brief for Appellant, supra note 42, at 8-9.
'5 Id. at 20-21.
48 Id.; see text accompanying note 45 supra.
' See note 48 infra.
46 See text accompanying note 49 infra. Courts generally have held that a taxpayer's
maintenance of a refund suit satisfies the inconsistency requirements of the mitigation pro-
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United States49 the Court of Claims examined the section 1311(b) incon-
sistency requirement and held that the maintenance of a refund suit con-
stitutes active inconsistency warranting the application of the mitiga-
tion provisions even when the refund suit is to recover a deficiency.
which the Commissioner erroneously assessed." In Chertkof, the tax-
payers brought a refund suit to recover an erroneously assessed defi-
ciency. 1 Accordingly, the Chertkofs satisfied the Court of Claims formu-
lation of the active inconsistency test as well as the passive inconsistency
test.2 The Fourth Circuit, therefore, correctly held that the Chertkofs
fulfilled the inconsistency requifements of section 1311(b).
5
1
Furthermore, the Chertkofs argued that section 1311(b) requires
that the party seeking to avoid the application of the mitigation provi-
sions maintain a position inconsistent with the position initially advanc-
ed. 4 The Chertkofs reasoned that since the Commissioner ultimately
adopted their initial position that 1966 was the correct tax year for the
stock redemption income, the inconsistency requirements of section
1311(b) were not satisfied.5 The Fourth Circuit in Chertkof correctly
held that for purposes of the inconsistent position requirement, the fact
that the determination adopted the Chertkofs' initial position is irrele-
vant.5 1 If section 1311(b) required the taxpayer to maintain a position in-
consistent with his initial stance, the Commissioner would be discourag-
visions, regardless of whether the court requires active or passive inconsistency. See
Yagoda v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 485, 490 (2d Cir.) (inconsistent position in response to
Commissioner's erroneous deficiency notice is passive inconsistency satisfying § 1311(b)),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 842 (1964); Karpe v. United States, 335 F.2d 454, 461-62 (Ct. Cl. 1964)
(maintenance of refund suit is active inconsistency satisfying § 1311(b)), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 964 (1965); TAX MNGMT (BNA) § 110-2nd, A9-10 (1978) (active inconsistency should only
require affirmative act); Clifford, Mitigation Provisions: Current Problems and Judicial In-
consistencies, 47 J. TAX. 68, 68-69 (1977).
" 410 F.2d 1247 (Ct. Cl. 1969). In Birchenough, the Internal Revenue Service assessed
deficiencies for income received in 1954 against taxpayers. Id. at 1249. Taxpayers paid the
tax in response to the assessed deficiencies. Id. Taxpayers, however, prevailed in a refund
suit which established the correct tax. years as 1950, 1951, and 1952. Id.
Id. at 1251.
s' 649 F.2d at 265-66.
See note 48 supra.
* See text accompanying notes 33-41 supra; note 32 supra.
649 F.2d at 267; see note 32 supra.
649 F.2d at 266. The Chertkofs' argument that the court must examine taxpayers in-
itial position for purposes of the inconsistent position requirement of § 1311(b) is without
merit. See note 32 supra. Section 1311(b) does not mention initial position in the inconsistent
position requirements. See I.R.C. § 1311(b); note 32 supra; note 56 infra.
' 649 F.2d at 267-68. Section 1311(b) requires inconsistency with the erroneous treat-
ment. See I.R.C. § 1311(b); note 32 supra. The inclusion of the Chertkofs' stock redemption
income in 1965 constituted the erroneous treatment. 649 F.2d at 267. The successful refund
suit for 1965 operated as a determination changing the tax year to 1966. Id.; I.R.C. §
1313(a)(1); see note 7 supra. The Chertkofs' refund suit for 1965 was inconsistent with the
Chertkofs' payment of taxes for the stock redemption income in 1965. See text accompany-
ing notes 32-52 supra.
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ed from ever contesting the proper tax year, for if the taxpayer's
original position proved correct the Commissioner would be precluded
from collecting any tax for an item if the limitations period had expired.
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Chertkof is harmonious with the
legislative history of the mitigation provisions. 7 The Senate Finance
Committee, in a report accompanying the Revenue Act of 1938, stated
that disputes over the correct year in which income is taxable should not
result in inequitable tax avoidance.-8 In proposing the provisions, the
Committee sought to prevent taxpayers from profiting by taking incon-
sistent positions and then hiding behind the statute of limitations to
avoid taxation. 9 The Committee stated further that the mitigation provi-
sions apply whether the inconsistency is fortuitous or by design. Thus,
the Committee Report does not support the Chertkofs' argument that
section 1311(b) requires intentional inconsistency."
While the Chertkofs did not argue directly that Comissioner error
prevented the Commissioner from benefiting from the application of the
mitigation provisions, the Chertkofs framed all arguments upon the arti-
ficial issue of Commissioner error and attempted to persuade the court
that error was an actual consideration. 2 To support the proposition that
Commissioner error precludes the application of the mitigation provi-
sions, the Chertkofs wrongly relied on Kappel v. Commissioner.3 In Kap-
pel, the Commissioner, through the application of the mitigation provi-
sions, sought to make a correcting adjustment in a year closed by the
statute of limitations at the time of the initial deficiency notice." The
Chertkof court distinguished Kappel because the correct tax year in
Chertkof was an open year at the time of the initial erroneous deficiency
notice. 5 Under the Chertkofs' reasoning, the Commissioner could never
benefit from the application of the mitigation provisions if the Commis-
7 See text accompanying notes 58-60 infra.
S. REP. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 48, 49-50 (1938).
s Id. at 49.
'~Id.
"Id.
62 649 F.2d at 267-69; see text accompanying notes 62-67 infra. The Chertkofs'
arguments focusing on the Commissioner's error in ascertaining the correct tax year stress
an artificial issue because no language in the mitigation provisions supports the arguments.
See I.R.C. §§ 1311-1314; notes 5 & 32 supra. In addition, courts have expressly rejected the
Chertkofs' arguments. See notes 29 & 48 supra.
" See Brief for Appellant, supra note 42, at 17-21; note 43 supra; text accompanying
notes 64-67 infra.
" Kappel v. Commissioner, 615 F.2d at 93. In Kappel, the Commissioner, through the
application of the mitigation provisions, attempted to open a year that was closed at the
time of the. initial deficiency notice by issuing an erroneous deficiency notice for an open
year. Id. at 99. The decision in Kappel that the mitigation provisions do not apply reached a
result contrary to that of § 1.1312-3 of the Treasury Regulations. Treas. Reg. § 1.1312-3
(1956); see note 43 supra.
649 F.2d at 269 n.4.
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sioner erroneously issued a deficiency notice." Similarly, the Chertkofs'
argument that the taxpayer must maintain a position inconsistent with
the taxpayer's initial position would preclude the application of the
mitigation provisions.'
The Fourth Circuit in examining.the inconsistent position require-
ment in Chertkof addressed the artificial issue of Commissioner error
implicit in the Chertkofs' arguments on active inconsistency and incon-
sistency with the initial position." In doing so, the Chertkof court confus-
ed the meaning of the inconsistent position requirement. The Chertkof
court stated broadly that the mitigation provisions apply regardless of
who maintained the inconsistent position." Section 1311(b), however, ex-
pressly requires the party seeking to avoid the application of the mitiga-
tion provisions to maintain a position inconsistent with the erroneous
treatment of income." Thus, the court's statement that the mitigation
provisions apply regardless of who maintained the inconsistent position
is misleading and directly contradicts section 1311(b). In addressing tax-
payers' artificial argument on Commissioner error the court in Chertkof
obscured the requirements of the mitigation provisions. The Chertkof
facts exemplify the situation the mitigation provisions were formulated
to prevent.7' Without the mitigation provisions, the Chertkofs could
avoid all tax liability on an item for which they concededly owed taxes
simply because the Commissioner challenged the wrong tax year.2 Sec-
tion 1311(b) on its face only requires inconsistency with the error by the
party prevailing in the determination." Furthermore, section 1312(3)(A)
is silent as to which party must err.74 The Fourth Circuit, therefore, cor-
rectly abstained from adding new requirements to the already complex
mitigation provisions.
The Fourth Circuit in Chertkof reached the correct decision despite
its confusing opinion. The passive inconsistency test the Tax Court
See note 67 infra.
'7 649 F.2d at 267. If the Commissioner mistakenly issued a deficiency notice for the
wrong tax year and the taxpayer conformed to the Commissioner's deficiency notice, a suc-
cessful challenge of the tax year by the taxpayer would ultimately use the taxpayer's initial
position if the taxpayer was correct at the outset. Therefore, under the Chertkofs' reason-
ing, the Commissioner could only change the tax year at his own risk, because if the tax-
payer was correct initially, the taxpayer could never fulfill the inconsistency requirements.
See text accompanying notes 54-56 supra.
649 F.2d at 267-69; see text accompanying notes 42-56 supra.
69 649 F.2d at 268.
70 I.R.C. § 1311(b); see note 32 supra.
7' See text accompanying notes 73-75 infra.
7 649 F.2d at 269. The Chertkofs conceded that they owed tax in either 1965 or 1966.
Id. The mitigation provisions were promulgated to prevent the double avoidance of tax that
would occur in Chertkof if the provisions did not apply. See S. REP. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d
Sess. 48, 49-50 (1938); text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
" See I.R.C. § 1311(b); notes 32 & 56 supra.
7' See I.R.C. § 1312(3)(A); notes 5 & 29 supra.
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employs correctly isolates the issue of whether inequitable taxation or
tax avoidance would occur without the application of the mitigation pro-
visions of sections 1311-1314 of the IRC 5 Accordingly, the application of
the mitigation provisions in Chertkof furthers the policy behind sections
1311-1314." The Fourth Circuit's opinion, however, is confusing. The
Chertkof court over-emphasized the artificial issue of Commissioner
error and failed to adequately distinguish error from the real require-
ment of inconsistency." The application of the mitigation provisions,
while often complex and confusing in other contexts, should have been
straightforward in Chertkof7 8
WILLIAM T. JOHNSON
7 See text accompanying notes 57-61 supra.
7I !d.
7 See text accompanying notes 68-70 supra; note 32 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 22-32 supra.
